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Life, Liberty, or Your Children: California Parents’
Fifth Amendment Quandary between SelfIncrimination and Family Preservation
Kendra Weber*
INTRODUCTION
“For years, the courts have been the unseen partners in child welfare—yet they
are vested with enormous responsibility.”1

At any given time in the United States, more than half a million children are in government custody.2 One out of every twenty children will enter such custody.3 Child protective agencies responding to allegations of
child abuse and neglect routinely violate the constitutional rights of children and their parents.4 Juvenile dependency courts must step in to formally
determine whether the alleged abuse or neglect occurred and whether a
child should be returned to the home.5 These specialized courts are
charged with protecting the rights of all parties involved, including parents.6 However, dependency courts frequently compound the problem
when they overlook and, at times, blatantly deny parents their Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.7
Depending upon the allegations, some parents may face not only the
possibility of losing their child, but also the threat of criminal prosecution.8
*
J.D. Candidate 2009, Chapman University School of Law. B.A. Criminal Justice, California
State University, Fullerton. I would like to thank Frank Ospino for introducing me to the issues facing
families in the dependency system. I would also like to thank Paul DeQuattro for all of his research
guidance, insight, and encouragement. Finally, I thank my loving family for their never-ending support,
especially my parents and Symphony, who have all been so patient with me.
1 THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY,
PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 13 (2004) [hereinafter THE PEW
COMMISSION].
2 Id. at 9.
3 State Efforts to Comply with Federal Child Welfare Reviews: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Res. of H. Comm. Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 54 (2004) (statement of Rep. Baca from California), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/
28/07/29.pdf [hereinafter State Efforts].
4 Id. (“[T]he unwarranted seizure of children from non-neglectful homes has become a national
problem of staggering proportions.”).
5 THE PEW COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13.
6 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY STATEMENT 3
(Apr. 1991).
7 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 2007); In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1992).
8 For example, when a dependency petition alleges domestic violence against a spouse or part-
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These parents are forced into the Hobson’s choice9 between cooperating
with the dependency court at the expense of their Fifth Amendment privilege or preserving the privilege and losing their child. The paramount concern of the dependency system is the best interest of the child, and it is in
the best interest of the child that the parent testifies.10 However, “[t]he
mere existence of a civil regulatory system may not trump the essence of
the Fifth Amendment.”11 Furthermore, without a guarantee that their testimony will not be used against them in a criminal case, many parents will
decline to testify.12 Thus, courts must be able to compel parents to testify
without violating the Fifth Amendment.
Part I of this comment discusses parents’ Fifth Amendment privilege
and its application in dependency proceedings. Part II presents an overview of California’s dependency system and exposes its true punitive nature—the focus on the alleged wrongdoing of the parent and the threat of
losing his or her child. Part II further demonstrates how two fundamental
rights collide when parents are essentially forced to waive their Fifth
Amendment privilege or forfeit their parental rights. Part II argues that
parents must be able to safely testify in dependency proceedings to ensure
the disclosure of all relevant information in each child’s case.
Part III analyzes how dependency courts may compel parents to testify
despite their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Under California
law, the only constitutional method available is to grant immunity that
shields the testimony, and any evidence derived from it, from use against
the parent in a subsequent criminal case. However, dependency courts may
not grant such immunity on their own motion, but must instead cooperate
with the very agency that may wish to prosecute the parent for a crime.13
ner, a child may be removed from the home, and the allegedly offending parent may also be guilty of a
felony. In re Heather A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 321 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that domestic violence in
the household where a child lives is grounds to remove the child); CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(1) (West
2008) (providing increased criminal  sanctions  “[w]hen  battery  is  committed against a spouse, a person
with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant's child, former
spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a
dating or engagement relationship”);;  id. § 273.5(a) (making it a felony to inflict corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon one’s spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the
parent of one’s child).
9 A  “Hobson’s  choice”  refers  to  a  choice  where  there really is no choice at all, because both options are unacceptable. Its use arose from the tale of Tobias Hobson, an English stable keeper who offered   riders   the   “choice”   between   the   horse   closest   to   the   door   or   no   horse   at   all.      JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 857 (Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1903).
10 See Collins v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Ct. App. 1977) (noting the “clear  legislative policy . . . that all relevant evidence should be disclosed in proceedings of this nature in order to
protect the paramount interest of the safety and welfare of the child.”).
11 In re Ariel G., 858 A.2d 1007, 1014 (Md. 2004); see also In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d
879, 883–84 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the ability to assert a constitutional right does not yield to the
best interests of a child).
12 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 110–11 (involving a father who refused to testify despite a court order).
13 The current procedure calls for the involvement of the criminal prosecutor in the decision to
grant use and derivative use immunity. CAL. CT. R. 5.548.
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When the prosecuting agency prefers that such immunity not be granted,
the court may be left without evidence that is crucial to an informed decision in the case.14
Because there is currently no avenue available that allows parents to
voluntarily testify in their child’s case without risking their Fifth Amendment privilege, Part IV argues for a legislative grant of blanket use and derivative use immunity for all parents in all dependency matters without involving the criminal prosecutor. This part further argues that, for such
immunity to be fully effective, and to alleviate any resulting prosecutorial
burden,15 criminal prosecuting agencies must be excluded from dependency
proceedings. Such protection will dissolve the unacceptable choice facing
parents who wish to cooperate with the court and reunite with their children
without forfeiting their Fifth Amendment privilege.
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION DIRECTLY APPLIES TO PARENTS IN JUVENILE
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
In some circumstances, the alleged conduct that brings a child within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile dependency court may also constitute a
crime.16 The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”17 When parents face not only the possibility of losing their child, but the additional
threat of criminal prosecution, they are afforded the same Fifth Amendment
protections as a criminal defendant and may properly refuse to testify in
their child’s dependency case.18
In order to successfully invoke Fifth Amendment protection, an individual’s statement must be compelled and self-incriminating.19 The selfincrimination element is met whenever a witness’s answers would merely
“furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the [witness]”
for a criminal offense.20 The United States Supreme Court has not limited

The prosecutor is permitted to show cause why such immunity should not be granted. Id.
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (affirming that a grant of immunity
“imposes  on  the  prosecution  the  affirmative  duty  to  prove  that  the  evidence  it  proposes  to  use  is  derived  
from a legitimate source wholly independent of  the  compelled  testimony.”).
16 See supra note 8.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Similar protections are guaranteed by the California Constitution and state statutes. CAL. CONST.,  art.  I,  §  15  (“Persons  may  not . . . be compelled in a
criminal cause to be a witness against themselves.”);;  e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 2007)  (“To  the  
extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a
person  has  a  privilege  to  refuse  to  disclose  any  matter  that  may  tend  to  incriminate  him.”).
18 In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 120 (Ct. App. 2007); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266
U.S.  34,  40  (1924)  (affirming  that  the   Fifth  Amendment  privilege  “applies  alike  to  civil  and  criminal  
proceedings,  wherever  the  answer  might  tend  to  subject  to  criminal  responsibility  him  who  gives  it.”).
19 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
20 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see also People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388,
408 (Cal. 1992) (acknowledging that a person may invoke the constitutional privilege against self14
15
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the Fifth Amendment privilege to a defendant testifying during a criminal
trial, but has broadened its scope to “any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings.”21 Furthermore, the California Legislature recognizes the overlap in certain classes of criminal and dependency statutes22 and
expressly acknowledges the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege
in juvenile dependency proceedings.23 Given the broad scope of the privilege and its clear implications in certain dependency matters, a parent in a
juvenile dependency proceeding is entitled to the full protections afforded
by the Fifth Amendment, regardless of whether criminal charges have been
filed.24
II. CALIFORNIA DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IMPROPERLY
COMPEL PARENTS TO WAIVE THEIR FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS
Dependency cases are among the most difficult to manage.25 They involve numerous participants, multiple parties with potentially conflicting
interests, and a complex, ongoing court process.26 A dependency court
should “function on a socio-legal basis where the constitutional rights of
children and parents are not abridged, and where the purpose of the court is
therapeutic and preventive, rather than retributive and punitive.”27 Thus,
not only are parents entitled to the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment, they must also be allowed to fully participate in their child’s
case. However, under California dependency law, parents who face the
risk of criminal prosecution are forced to choose between the two.28 This
Hobson’s  choice violates the fundamental rights of parents and their children and renders dependency courts ineffective.
A.

Juvenile Dependency Proceedings are Quasi-Criminal in Nature

Juvenile dependency proceedings are considered civil rather than
criminal, because their primary purpose is not to punish parents, but to pro-

incrimination for reasons other than guilt).
21 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
22 See supra note 8.
23 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §   311(b)   (West   2007)   (“In   the   hearing   the   minor,   parents   or  
guardians, have a privilege against self-incrimination.”);;  CAL. CT. R. 5.674(d)  (“At  the  detention  hearing, the child, the parent, and the guardian have the right to assert the privilege against selfincrimination.”);;  id. 5.534(k)(1)(A) & 5.682(b)(2) (2008) (both providing that the court must advise the
parent in dependency cases of the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination).
24 Turley,  414  U.S.  at  77  (providing  that  the  Fifth  Amendment  applies  in  “any other proceeding”  
where  the  testimony  “might incriminate [the witness] in future criminal  proceedings”)  (emphasis added).
25 NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
(1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/child/carpt.txt (last visited June 3, 2008).
26 Id.
27 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 6.
28 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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tect the child’s health and safety.29 However, physically removing a child
from the home interferes with the child’s personal liberty and the right to
remain with his or her family of origin.30 In turn, parents face significant
state interference with the fundamental right to raise their children and, ultimately, the termination of their parental rights.31 Thus, dependency proceedings are more accurately referred to as “quasi-criminal.”32 In fact,
most of the rules governing civil proceedings do not apply,33 and the children and parents involved are endowed with rights similar to those of a criminal defendant.34
A dependency case typically begins when the county welfare department receives a report alleging child abuse or neglect. If the assigned social worker finds the allegations substantiated, he or she may immediately
remove the child from the home.35 Within two days after the child is removed, the worker must file a dependency petition requesting that the child
be declared a dependent of the juvenile court.36 After the petition is filed,

29 In re Mary S.,  230  Cal.  Rptr.  726,  728  (Ct.  App.  1986)  (“Dependency  proceedings  are  civil  in  
nature,  designed  not  to  prosecute  a  parent,  but  to  protect  the  child.”);;  Lois R. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.
Rptr.  158,  162  (Ct.  App.  1971)  (“[D]ependency  proceedings  are  civil and have been conducted without
strict  adherence  to  all  the  formalities  of  a  criminal  trial.”).
30 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 n.7, 760 n.11 (1982)  (noting  that  “important liberty
interests of the child . . .  may  also  be  affected  by  a  [dependency]  proceeding”).
Witnesses stated that only about three percent of the children who are seized or taken into
custody were physically abused. What is even worse they said, is that the children who are
taken into state custody have an eight to eleven times greater chance of being abused than
those who remain in their own homes.
State Efforts, supra note 3, at 54.
31 Kramer, 455 U.S. at 753   (finding   that  parents  have   a   “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the
care, custody, and management of their child,” which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
Terminating parental rights permanently deprives parents of this fundamental interest. See CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 366.26 (Deering 2008).
32 GARY C. SEISER & KURT KUMLI, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2.10[2] (2003) (noting that courts have characterized the dependency system inconsistently—some have viewed  it  as  “civil  in  nature”  while  others  have  viewed  it  as  “quasi-criminal”);;  see
also In re Kristin  H.,  54  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  722,  737  (Ct.  App.  1996)  (“While  the  parent  in  modern  day  dependency proceedings may not stand in the same shoes as a criminal defendant facing a loss of personal
liberty . . . to say simply that dependency proceedings are civil in nature fails to acknowledge the fundamental difference  between  these  proceedings  and  the  ordinary  civil  action.”).
In most dependency matters the focus is against the parent and the prospect faced is the
drastic result of loss of his child. Although legal scholars may deemphasize the adversary
nature of dependency proceedings and characterize the removal of the child from parental
custody as nonpunitive action in the best interests of the child, most parents would view the
loss of custody as dire punishment.
Lois R. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 158, 162 (Ct. App. 1971).
33 In re Jennifer  R.,  17  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  759,  764  (Ct.  App.  1993)  (“Dependency  proceedings in the
juvenile court are special proceedings governed by their own rules and statutes. Unless otherwise specified,  the  requirements  of  the  Civil  Code  and  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  do  not  apply.”)  (internal  citations omitted).
34 For  instance,  “the parents’ right not to be separated from their child entitles them to appointment of counsel [under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317], and the same degree of review of
the  case  on  appeal  as  criminal  defendants.”    In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. at 728 n.3.
35 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 306 (West 2006).
36 Id. § 313(a); CAL. CT. R. 5.520(b)(1).
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the court holds a “detention hearing” to approve the child’s removal.37
Next, there is a “jurisdictional hearing” to determine whether the alleged
abuse or neglect occurred.38 The California Welfare and Institutions Code
requires the court to release the child unless there is a prima facie showing
of abuse or neglect.39 However, it also provides that evidence of an injury
alone can be sufficient to declare the child a dependent of the court.40
When the court makes a finding of abuse or neglect, a “dispositional
hearing” is held to determine the appropriate course of action.41 The court
may allow the child to return home but require the family to participate in
family maintenance services, thus subjecting the family to future hearings
and investigations by the social worker.42 Generally, if the court orders that
the child is to remain out of the home, the family must participate in “reunification services” to resolve the issues determined by the court before the
child is returned.43 If the parent does not successfully reunify with the
child within the statutory time limit,44 the court must terminate these services and select long-term foster care, guardianship, or adoption as a permanent plan for the child.45 At this stage, parents may be forever deprived
of the care and custody of their child.46 These intrusions into private family
life, and the potential for permanent destruction of the family unit, make it
imperative that dependency courts ensure that the fundamental rights of
children and their parents are not trammeled in the process of resolving
sensitive family issues.
B.

When Parents Cannot Safely Testify in their Child’s’ Dependency
Case, they are Forced to Choose between Conflicting Fundamental
Rights

The privilege against self-incrimination is designed to avoid the “cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”47 A parent in a depen-

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 315 (West 2006).
Id. §§ 355, 356.
Id. § 319.
Id. §§ 355.1(a), 360(d).
Id. § 358.
Id. §§ 360(b), 362. “Family Maintenance provides support services to prevent abuse/neglect
while the child remains in his or her home. Generally, these services include counseling, parent training, respite care, and temporary in-home  care.”    Child  Abuse  and  Neglect  in  California  (Part  I),  Legislative   Analyst’s   Office   (Jan.   1996),   http://www.lao.ca.gov/1996/010596_child_abuse/cw11096a.html
(last visited Sept. 14, 2008) [hereinafter LAO].
43 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2006). “Family Reunification provides support services to the family while the child is in temporary foster care. Typically, these services include counseling,  emergency  shelter  care,  parent  training,  and  teaching  homemaking  skills.”    LAO,  supra note 42.
44 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2006) (providing a statutory time limit of twelve
months for a child who was three years of age or older on the date of removal, and six months for a
child under three years of age, but allowing for an extension up to eighteen months under specified circumstances).
45 Id. §§ 361.5, 366.26.
46 Id. § 366.26.
47 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
37
38
39
40
41
42
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dency case also faces the potential loss of the care and custody of his or her
child. To expedite dependency matters, California law creates a presumption that the alleged abuse occurred if the parent does not present evidence
to the contrary.48 Thus, while the burden of proof in a criminal trial is on
the prosecution, the initial burden in a dependency case essentially falls on
the parent.49 Because a parent’s decision not to testify may be equated with
a failure to present evidence,50 which will likely result in the child being
adjudged a dependent of the court,51 parents are currently compelled to testify by the threat of losing their child. Once the court establishes jurisdiction, parents generally must admit to the problem that led to removal before
the child will be returned, further compelling them to disclose potentially
incriminating information.52
The court may also order a parent to participate in therapy as part of a
family reunification plan.53 While disclosures made in court-ordered therapy are confidential,54 mandatory reporting laws require therapists to report
incidents of child abuse to the proper authorities.55 This leads parents to
suppress potentially incriminating admissions in court-ordered therapy as
well.56 Less than full participation in therapy is contrary to the child’s best
interest because it renders the therapeutic process ineffective.57 In addition,
the therapist may conclude that a parent who does not admit the alleged
conduct during treatment, or who appears evasive, is not meaningfully participating, and the court may refuse to return the child.58
48 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007) (“Where the court finds that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained
except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, . . . that finding
shall be prima facie evidence).
49 While the burden of proof at the initial stages of a dependency matter rests with the agency
seeking jurisdiction over the child, the presumption of abuse created by Section 355.1(a) shifts the burden of production to the caretaker. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §  355.1(c)  (West  2007)  (“The  presumption created by subdivision (a) constitutes a presumption  affecting  the  burden  of  producing  evidence.”)    
Thus, the agency need not present any evidence other than the fact that an injury occurred.
50 See In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 119 (Ct. App. 2007).
51 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007).
52 In re Jessica  B.,  254  Cal.  Rptr.  883,  890  (Ct.  App.  1989)  (“[R]eunification  cannot  occur  until  
[the parent] admits abuse and works through appropriate remorseful feelings.”).
53 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (West 2007).
54 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West 2008).
55 A   therapist   must   report   child   abuse   when   he   or   she   “has   knowledge   of   or   observes   a   child  
whom  [the  therapist]  knows  or  reasonably  suspects  has  been  the  victim  of  child  abuse  or  neglect.”    CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 2008).
56 E.g., In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 425 (Ct. App. 1992) (involving a father who refused to undergo a psychological evaluation or participate in counseling due to his pending criminal
case, despite the fact that he felt  it  “would  have  been  helpful”).
57 ELIANA GIL, CAL. HEALTH & WELFARE AGENCY, THE CALIFORNIA CHILD ABUSE REPORTING
LAW: ISSUES AND ANSWERS FOR PROFESSIONALS 19   (1986)   (“Some   clients   will   never   admit   to   the  
abuse, and therefore make the possibility of obtaining therapeutic  help  minimal.”).
58 In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 119 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he law may legitimately require
a parent to admit responsibility for wrongful acts as a condition to be fulfilled in therapy . . . [and] the
parent's decision  not  to  acknowledge  his  or  her  wrongdoing”  may  result  in  “consequences  occasioned
by   the   lack   of   cooperation   in   the   reunification   process”).      Lack   of   cooperation   in   the   reunification  
process is likely to lead to termination of parental rights. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(e),

WEBER

162

12/22/2008 1:18 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 12:155

Because asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege, whether in the initial stages of a dependency matter, or later in the reunification process, can
interfere with parents’ chances of reuniting with their children, parents
must choose between the fundamental liberty interest in raising their children59 or their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus,
even parents who are not ordered to testify are still effectively “compelled”
to do so in violation of the Fifth Amendment by the threat of losing their
child.60
C.

Allowing All Parents to Safely Testify in their Child’s Case will
Improve California’s Dependency Courts

In 1997, California’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) released the California Juvenile Court Improvement Project Report, the culmination of a statewide analysis of the juvenile dependency court system.61
The recommendations of the 1997 report were general in nature and designed simply to highlight areas for improvement.62 Following the implementation phase of the initial improvement project, the AOC’s Center for
Families, Children and the Courts performed a reassessment in 2005.63 Although California made substantial progress since the 1997 assessment, the
2005 reassessment found that many of the originally identified issues remained64 and specified six guiding principles to further improve California’s dependency system:
[1] The judicial branch should take a leadership role, and partner with other
stakeholders at the state and local levels, to improve the experiences of and out-

366.22(a)  (West  2007)  (“The  failure   of  the  parent  or  legal  guardian  to  participate  regularly  and  make  
substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return
would   be   detrimental.”); id. §   366.26(c)(1)   (“A   finding . . . under Section 366.21 or 366.22, that the
court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent or guardian and has terminated
reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination  of  parental  rights.”).
59 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The  fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”).
60 See In re M.C.P.,  571  A.2d  627,  640  (Vt.  1989)  (finding  that  “the  State  may  not  impose  a  penalty or sanctions against an individual for invoking the [Fifth Amendment] privilege,”  and  “[t]here  is  
no question that deprivation of custody of a child is a sanction for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”);;
cf. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973) (holding  that  “answers  elicited  upon  the  threat  of  the  
loss of employment are   compelled”   and   entitled   to Fifth Amendment protection) (emphasis added).
Surely, testimony obtained upon the  threat  of  losing  one’s  child  is  likewise  “compelled.”
61 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT IMPROVEMENT
PROJECT REPORT (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/child/carpt.txt (last visited June 2,
2008). California’s initial assessment took place from 1995 to 1996 and included a comprehensive review of dependency laws, procedures, and practices, as well as public hearings, focus groups, and
roundtable discussions. Id.
62 Id.
63 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS,
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM REASSESSMENT 1 (2005),
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/CIPReassessmentReport.pdf.
The
reassessment included a progress report on the original recommendations, a detailed review of dependency courts, and new recommendations for court improvement. Id.
64 Id. at 2–3.
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comes for children and families in the dependency system, increase permanency,
and reduce the number of children in the system.
[2] Dependency hearings must be timely and must provide each party with meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard. Sufficient information must be
accessible and available for informed judicial decision making.
[3] Courthouse procedures must ensure accountability, efficiency, open communication, safety, and respect for each party’s rights.
[4] The dependency system must be staffed by well-trained judicial officers, attorneys, and other professionals, who are given the resources and reasonable caseloads to do their jobs effectively.
[5] National, state, and local collaborative efforts should be increased.
[6] California courts must ensure their compliance with all relevant state and federal laws.65

Consistent with these principles, parents must have a fair opportunity
to communicate openly with the court and fully participate in reunification
efforts without forfeiting their fundamental rights. When parents fear criminal prosecution, they are unlikely to testify in their child’s case or to participate in court-ordered therapy.66 Essentially, they hand their children
over to the mercy of the court. However, the children who fall into the
arms of California’s dependency system deserve to have their fate decided
based upon all relevant information, including that which may only be
available from their parents’ testimony. Thus, allowing all parents to safely
testify in dependency matters not only protects the constitutional rights of
parents; it also serves the best interests of the child and furthers the goals of
the dependency system.
III. A GRANT OF USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY CAN
SUPPLANT A PARENT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
A court may lawfully force a witness to testify over a valid assertion
of the Fifth Amendment privilege only by granting immunity that protects
against the use of the testimony, and any evidence derived from it, in a subsequent criminal prosecution.67 The limited form of testimonial immunity
provided by California Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1(f) is
not enough to override an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.68
However, dependency courts frequently misinterpret the law and improperly compel parents to testify without following proper statutory procedures
to immunize their testimony.69
Id. at 1–2.
See, e.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 2007) (involving a father who
refused to testify at a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing); In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
422, 425 (Ct. App. 1992) (involving a father who refused to undergo psychological evaluation or counseling).
67 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–46 (1972).
68 See discussion infra Part III.B.
69 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 108 (footnote omitted); In re Brenda M., 72 Cal. Rptr.
65
66
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Under current law, dependency courts may not unilaterally grant the
constitutionally required level of immunity, nor interpret the statute to expand the limited immunity originally contemplated by the legislature.70
Even the exclusionary rule, which makes unconstitutionally obtained evidence inadmissible in a criminal case,71 does not authorize dependency
courts to compel parents’ testimony merely because it would produce the
same result as a grant of immunity.72 The exclusionary rule was developed
to deter constitutional violations, not to justify them.73
A. Use and Derivative Use Immunity Commensurate with the Fifth
Amendment Privilege is Required Before a Dependency Court Can
Compel a Parent’s Testimony
The Fifth Amendment privilege is not absolute—a witness may be
compelled in certain circumstances to testify even after invoking the protections of the privilege. The Supreme Court has recognized “the fact that
many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.”74 This rings painfully true in dependency matters. There is a compelling state interest in
coercing parental testimony, such that all relevant information will be disclosed to ensure an informed disposition of the child’s case.75
Immunizing parental testimony simultaneously allows dependency
courts to compel a parent to testify and protects that testimony from being
used against the parent in a criminal proceeding.76 However, the Supreme
3d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 2008).
70 See discussion infra Part III.C.
71 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961).
[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is
protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom
in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant. Absent such protection, if he is
nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
72 Some California courts fail to distinguish the exclusionary rule from an official grant of immunity and erroneously rely on the possibility of future exclusion to compel a witness to testify over a
valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment. Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357 (Ct.
App. 2007), review granted, depublished by 159 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2007). As noted in Spielbauer, this faulty assumption stems from California Supreme Court dicta in Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d
329,  331  (Cal.  1985)  (“As  a  matter  of  constitutional  law,  it  is  well  established  that . . . self-incrimination
rights are deemed adequately protected by precluding any use of [compelled] statements at a subsequent
criminal   proceeding.”   (citing   Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77–79 (1973)). Spielbauer, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 373–74.
73 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (describing the purpose of the exclusionary
rule  “to  deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by  removing  the  incentive  to  disregard  it.”).
74 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
75 Collins v. Superior Court, 141  Cal.  Rptr.  273,  277  (Ct.  App.  1977)  (“The clear legislative policy underlying [current California Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1] is that all relevant evidence should be disclosed in proceedings of this nature in order to protect the paramount interest of the
safety and welfare of the child.”).
76 Peter Lushing, Testimonial Immunity and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination: A Study in
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Court long ago declared that immunity which “does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition
was designed to guard . . . is not a full substitute for that prohibition.”77 As
such, the power to compel testimony is not absolute and must be accompanied by a minimum level of immunity so as not to offend the Fifth Amendment.78 To be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, the protection afforded compelled testimony must leave both the parent and the
prosecutor in a subsequent criminal case in the same position as if the parent had never testified.79
In 1892, the Supreme Court found that granting a witness total “transactional immunity” from prosecution satisfies the Fifth Amendment.80 Under a grant of transactional immunity, a witness is absolutely immune from
being prosecuted for any criminal offense related to the compelled testimony.81 However, because the prosecutor’s hands become permanently tied
against bringing any related charge—even if the information is garnered
from a wholly independent source—a witness who is granted transactional
immunity is better off than if the testimony had never existed. Thus, the
Supreme Court later held that transactional immunity provides more protection than the Fifth Amendment requires.82
In 1972, the Court shaped a narrower rule of “use and derivative use
immunity,” whereby a person compelled to testify may still be prosecuted,
but neither the compelled statement, nor any evidence derived from it, can
be introduced in a criminal trial.83 The Court distinguished the requisite
“use and derivative use immunity” from mere “testimonial immunity”—
immunity that protects the testimony itself (but not its fruits) from being
used against a witness in a criminal proceeding.84 The Court reaffirmed
that testimonial immunity alone is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, testimony cannot be compelled with such a minimal
grant of protection.85 For testimony to be adequately protected, such that a
dependency court may compel a parent to testify, the testimony must not be
used in any manner in a subsequent criminal case—as if it never existed.86
Isomorphism, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690, 1691–92 (1982).
77 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1892).
78 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–46 (1972).
79 Murphy  v.  Waterfront  Comm’n,  378  U.S.  52,  79  (1964).
80 Counselman, 142 U.S. at 585–86.
81 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 57
(Yale Univ. Press 1997).
82 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (finding   “no   justification   in   reason   or   policy   for   holding   that   the  
Constitution  requires  an  amnesty  grant”).
83 Id. at  453  (holding  that  “immunity  from  use  and  derivative  use  is  coextensive  with  the  scope  of  
the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of
the  privilege.”).
84 See AMAR, supra note 81,   at   47   (explaining   that   under   a   “testimonial   immunity”   rule,   “the  
compelled words will never be introduced over the  defendant’s  objection  in  a  criminal  trial . . . but the
fruits of these compelled pretrial words will generally be admissible.”).
85 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453–54.
86 Id. at 462 (concluding that use  and  derivative  use  immunity  “leaves  the  witness  and  the prose-
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California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 355.1 Does Not
Provide Immunity Commensurate with the Fifth Amendment

The California Legislature encourages parents to participate in dependency matters by providing limited testimonial immunity. 87 California
Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1(f) provides: “Testimony by a
parent, guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor
made the subject of a [juvenile dependency proceeding] shall not be admissible as evidence in any other action or proceeding.”88 But Section
355.1(f) fails to provide “protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a
crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means of
convicting the witness or party.”89
While the testimony itself may not be admissible as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution under Section 355.1(f) (mere testimonial immunity), nothing prohibits the use of information gained directly or indirectly from the testimony (as would use and derivative use immunity). For
example, law enforcement officers could interview potential witnesses disclosed by parents to gather information for use against the parents in a
criminal proceeding. Because the statutory prohibition against the admissibility of a parent’s testimony does not supplant their Fifth Amendment
privilege, a parent’s testimony cannot currently be compelled without guaranteeing that neither it nor its fruits will be used in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.90 In addition, while courts have decided that a parent’s disclo-

cutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege . . . [and] therefore is coextensive with the privilege  and  suffices  to  supplant  it.”).
87 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(f) (West 2007). William Wesley Patton, a leading authority
on California dependency law, provides a detailed and informative analysis of the legislative history of
Section 355.1, explaining the addition of subsection (f) and its purpose to encourage, not compel, parental testimony. Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Child Abuse Dependency Proceedings: Might Parents Be Their Own Worst Witnesses?, 11 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 101, 125–
27 (2007).
88 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(f) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
89 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 454 (internal quotes and citations omitted); In re Mark A., 68 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 2007).
90 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449–54. In Kastigar, the Supreme Court upheld a federal immunity
statute that provided use and derivative use immunity to witnesses whose testimony was compelled. Id.
at 453. The Court also reanalyzed the Immunity Act of 1868 (“Act”)   that it previously criticized in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Id. at 453–54. The Act was similar in scope to Section
355.1(f),  providing  that  “no  evidence  obtained  from  a  party  or  witness  by  means  of  a  judicial  proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him . . . in any court of the United
States . . . .”    Id. at 449–50 (internal quotations omitted). In Kastigar, the Court asserted that the Act
would still be
plainly deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence
derived from his compelled testimony . . . because the immunity granted was incomplete,
in that it merely forbade the use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness from
future prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony.
Id. at 453–54 (internal quotations omitted).

WEBER

12/22/2008 1:18 PM

2008]

Life, Liberty, or Your Children

167

sures in therapy are also protected by Section 355.1(f),91 the statute does
not provide the necessary level of immunity to compel parents to make
such disclosures.
C.

California Dependency Courts Cannot Unilaterally Grant the
Necessary Immunity to Compel a Parent’s Testimony

A dependency court that unilaterally grants a parent use and derivative
use immunity inappropriately overrides the intent of the legislature and
possibly the will of the executive.92 For nearly twenty years, dependency
courts have incorrectly assumed that a parent’s Fifth Amendment privilege
is sufficiently protected by Section 355.1(f) and have compelled parents to
testify over a valid assertion of their Fifth Amendment privilege.93 A California dependency case recently reached the appellate level where it was
finally confirmed that Section 355.1(f) does not provide immunity commensurate with the Fifth Amendment.94 The appellate court also correctly
decided that a dependency court cannot unilaterally grant the necessary
level of immunity to compel parents to testify95 absent a clearly expressed
grant of such authority by the legislature.96
The power to write laws rests with the legislature, and the courts must
adhere to the express intent of the legislature when it grants mere testimonial immunity.97 A dependency statute that does not attempt to provide
In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. 883, 893 (Ct. App. 1989).
See CAL. CONST. art.  III,  §  3  (2007)  (“The  powers  of  state  government  are  legislative,  executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others.”);;  In re Weber,  523  P.2d  229,  240  (Cal.  1974)  (finding  that  “the  power  to  provide  for  the  exercise  
of a grant of immunity [is] essentially a legislative function”  and  “the  decision  to  seek  immunity  is  an  
integral part of the charging process,”  left  to  the  prosecuting  attorneys);;  People v. Honig, 55 Cal. Rptr.
2d  555,  595  (Ct.  App.  1996)  (noting  that  “the  separation  of  powers  doctrine . . . precludes courts from
interfering with the executive decisions of prosecutorial authorities.”).
93 E.g., In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. at 893–94; In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct.
App. 2007).
94 In re Mark A.,  68  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  108  (finding  that  the  “statutory  immunity  provided  by  section
355.1(f) is more limited than the Fifth  Amendment  privilege  the  statute  purports  to  replace”).
95 Id. at 113 (“[I]f immunity were to be requested by [the social services agency] under [California Rule of Court] 5.548(d), the court must require notice to be given to the district attorney, particularly where, as here, there is a pending criminal prosecution.”)
96 See id. at  112  (”We  are  not  prepared  to  infer that section 355.1(f) provides full use and derivative use immunity for compelled testimony, contrary to the explicit language of the statute.”)  (internal  
quotations omitted); People v. Campbell, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340, 345 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that the court
is bound by the conditions and scope of immunity as provided in the statute). Even Kastigar does not
authorize a judicial grant of immunity absent statutory authority.
[Kastigar] held only that, pursuant to statutory authority to confer such immunity, the Government may constitutionally compel incriminating testimony in exchange for immunity
from use or derivative use of that testimony. Kastigar does not hold that a trial judge, acting without statutory authority to grant immunity, may . . . overrule an otherwise valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (Marshall, J. concurring) (citing Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972)).
97 Campbell, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 345; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §  1858  (West  2007)  (“In  the  construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms
91
92
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the court with authority to compel testimony need not grant use and derivative use immunity.98 Thus, if the legislature intended to compel testimony,
the statute would expressly say so and would provide for the requisite use
and derivative use immunity.99 Because Section 355.1(f) says nothing
about compelling testimony and only grants limited testimonial immunity,
it is reasonable to infer that the legislature did not intend to grant the court
authority to compel parents to testify.100 A dependency court must not read
such broad immunity into the statute, but “should stay its hand and let the
legislature decide whether the statute needs to be amended.”101
Similarly, a unilateral judicial grant of immunity may encroach upon
the discretion of the executive branch.102 A prosecutor, like the legislature,
may have legitimate reasons for granting limited testimonial immunity,
even though the scope of that immunity is insufficient to compel a witness’s testimony.103 If a witness is compelled to testify under a grant of use
and derivative use immunity, the prosecution in a subsequent criminal proceeding has an “affirmative duty to prove that the evidence . . . is derived
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony,”104 thereby increasing the prosecutorial burden.105 Thus, a prosecutor
may wish to forgo a grant of such immunity. Furthermore, the criminal
prosecutor is often not a party to the dependency matter and may have little
interest, if any, in granting immunity to parents in dependency proceedings.106 As such, it makes sense that current California law involves the
prosecutor in the decision to grant immunity.107

or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”).
98 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (acknowledging that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated unless testimony is compelled).
99 E.g., CAL. CT. R. 5.548(b) (expressly granting  a  judge  the  authority  to  compel  a  witness’s  testimony by following specified procedures and providing the necessary use and derivative use immunity
therefor).
100 See Patton, supra note 87, at 122–27 (demonstrating that the California legislature was not attempting to compel parents to testify, but was merely trying to ease the harsh presumption of abuse that
a parent must overcome under the statute).
101 In re Elan E., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 532 (Ct. App. 2000).
102 See supra note 92; see also In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr.3d 106, 113 (Ct. App. 2007) (confirming that   “law   enforcement   and   the   prosecution   of   crimes   is   part   of   the executive branch of government”).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 710 (11th Cir. 1998) (regarding a valid proffer  agreement  which  permitted  the  government  to  pursue  investigative  leads  derived  from  a  witness’s  
testimony and to use the evidence derived from those leads against the witness in a subsequent criminal
proceeding).
104 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
105 See United States v. Turkish,  623  F.2d  769,  775  (2d  Cir.  1980)  (indicating  that  “while  the  prosecution remains theoretically free under Kastigar to prosecute a witness granted use immunity, the obstacles  to  a  successful  prosecution  can  be  substantial”).
106 In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 113 n.4 (“The appearance of the district attorney in a juvenile
dependency case is rare, at least in Orange County.”).
107 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d) (requiring the dependency court to give the prosecution notice and an
opportunity to be heard before granting immunity to a parent).
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Just as the criminal prosecutor is often not a party to dependency matters, dependency judges act within a specialized court system entirely distinct from the adult criminal system.108 Dependency judges may be more
interested in the resolution of the dependency matter and less interested or
familiar with criminal prosecution. When this is the case, a unilateral decision to immunize or compel a parent’s testimony may not account for the
increased burden imposed on the criminal prosecution or the statutory plan
approved by the citizenry. Rather, the decision may focus primarily upon
the preferences and interests of the parties involved in the dependency matter (e.g., the minor or guardian ad litem acting on behalf of the minor, the
social services agency, another parent or guardian, potential foster or adoptive parents, or prospective placements for the child) and the judicial officer’s interest in hearing all available evidence necessary to make an informed disposition of the case.109 Thus, a dependency court should not
endeavor to immunize or compel a parent’s testimony on its own motion
and without statutory authority.
D. The Exclusionary Rule is meant to Deter Constitutional Violations,
Not to Supplant a Parent’s Fifth Amendment Privilege
When parents are improperly compelled to testify absent a grant of the
proper level of immunity, their Fifth Amendment privilege may be protected by the exclusionary rule. Under this rule, when a witness is compelled to answer in violation of the right to remain silent, he or she may object to the admission of the compelled answers, and any evidence derived
from them, in a subsequent criminal action.110 Thus, a parent who is ordered to testify against a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege may be
automatically vested with protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment.111 However, reliance on the exclusionary rule as a tool to compel
self-incrimination contradicts the Fifth Amendment mandate. The fact that
the Fifth Amendment may be violated in a case that never reaches trial demonstrates that the privilege is more than a constitutional rule of evidentiary admissibility or exclusion.112 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule is
108 See supra note 29; cf. In re Noel N., 465 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1008 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983) (finding
that a family court has limited jurisdiction and a family court judge may not grant immunity to a witness in a delinquency proceeding).
109 E.g., In re Joanna Y., 10  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  422,  426  (Ct.  App.  1992)  (improperly  stating  that  “the  
privilege against self-incrimination is inapplicable in child welfare proceedings because all relevant
evidence should be disclosed to protect the paramount interest of the safety and welfare  of  the  child.”).    
But see In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118 (finding that the above statement in Joanna Y.  was  “clearly  wrong.”).
110 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (noting that where a witness is not granted use and
derivative use immunity, but “he   is   nevertheless   compelled   to   answer,   his   answers   are   inadmissible
against  him  in  a  later  criminal  prosecution.”).
111 Adams  v.  Maryland,  347  U.S.  179,  181  (1954)  (“A  witness  does  not  need  any  statute  to  protect
him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth
Amendment  takes  care  of  that  without  a  statute.”).
112 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (finding that, when the government
compels testimony by threatening to inflict  sanctions  and  does  not  guarantee  immunity,  “that  testimony  
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meant to deter unlawful violations of the Fifth Amendment,113 and is in no
way a substitute for a guaranteed grant of immunity sufficient to compel a
parent’s testimony.114 As such, a dependency court cannot rely on the exclusionary rule to support its own violation of the Constitution.
E.

California Dependency Courts may Currently Compel a Parent’s
Testimony by Following the Procedure Set Forth in California Rules
of Court 5.548

California Rule of Court 5.548 sets forth the procedure to grant parents use and derivative use immunity and authorizes the dependency court
to compel their testimony.115 Although this procedure has been on the
books for over a decade, parents have not been consistently afforded its
protection.116 This may be due to the false assumption that Section 355.1(f)
of the California Welfare & Institutions Code provides the necessary level
of immunity,117 or simply because dependency courts have erroneously
found the Fifth Amendment privilege inapplicable.118 In addition, the Social Services Agency and the criminal prosecution essentially control the
initiation of the immunity statute,119 and both are more likely to benefit
where the parent remains silent.120

is obtained in   violation   of   the   Fifth  Amendment”)   (emphasis   added);;   see also Turley, 414 U.S. at 83
(holding that disqualification from public contracting as a penalty for asserting the privilege, without a
guarantee of immunity, violates the Fifth Amendment).
113 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
114 As the Supreme Court eloquently stated in Maness v. Meyers:  “[R]eliance upon a later objection  or  motion  to  suppress  would  ‘let the  cat  out’  with  no  assurance  whatever  of  putting  it  back.”  419  
U.S. 449, 463 (1975). In Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, the Supreme Court elaborated that a civil trial court
lacks   the   power   to   grant   immunity   (except   as   authorized   by   statute),   and   a   “[c]ourt's compulsion order . . .  cannot  not  be  justified  by  the  subsequent  exclusion  of  the  compelled  testimony.”   459 U.S. 248,
261–62 (1983). In In re Mark A., the California court of appeal agreed:
[R]ules of evidence—applicable in a subsequent criminal proceeding—do not constitute an
automatic grant of use and derivative use immunity sufficient to compel testimony over a
Fifth Amendment objection; they do not represent the decision of the executive to request
immunized testimony; and they do not give absolute assurance to the witness that another
court on a later date will agree that information arguably derived from that testimony will
be excluded.
68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 117 (Ct. App. 2007).
115 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d).
116 Prior to January 1, 2007, California Rule of Court 1421 provided a similar procedure. Originally  effective  beginning  January  1,  1990,  the  statute  was  amended  in  1998  to  clarify  that  “no  testimony
or other information compelled under the order [to testify] or information directly or indirectly derived
from  the  testimony  or    other  information,  may  be  used  against  the  witness  in  any  criminal  case.”   CAL.
CT. R. 5.548.
117 See, e.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 108; In re Brenda M., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 688
(Ct. App. 2008); In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. 883, 892 (Ct. App. 1989).
118 See, e.g., In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1992).
119 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(c).
120 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007) (providing for a presumption of abuse
against a parent who does not present evidence to the contrary); Turkish v. United States, 623 F.2d 769,
775  (2d  Cir.  1980)  (noting  that,  under  a  grant  of  immunity,  “the  obstacles  to  a  successful  prosecution  
can  be  substantial.”).
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Pursuant to Rule 5.548, the Social Services Agency or the prosecuting
attorney may request that the court order a parent to testify or to present
evidence.121 If the Social Services Agency and the prosecuting attorney
jointly make the request, the judge must generally grant it.122 Rule 5.548
further provides that, “any answer given, evidence produced, or information derived there from must not be used against the witness in a
. . . criminal proceeding,”123 thus granting “protection commensurate with
that afforded by the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.”124 However, if the request is made solely by Social Services, the criminal prosecutor “must be
given the opportunity to show why immunity is not to be granted.”125 The
current procedure ensures that the criminal prosecutor has notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the dependency court can compel a parent’s
testimony and grant the requisite immunity. If immunity is granted, the increased burden on the criminal prosecution attaches, serving as a disincentive for the prosecutor to seek such immunity.126 In addition, the Social
Services Agency benefits from the presumption of abuse against a parent
where the parent is unable to present evidence to the contrary.127 Thus, it is
not surprising that this procedure is under-utilized.
IV. GRANTING USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY TO ALL
PARENTS WHILE EXCLUDING PROSECUTORS FROM
DEPENDENCY MATTERS WILL ALLOW DEPENDENCY COURTS TO
LAWFULLY ACCESS ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION WITHOUT
INTERFERING WITH THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES
Parents are currently unable to voluntarily testify in their child’s case
without risking their Fifth Amendment privilege.128 In addition, dependency courts may not compel parents’ testimony without involving the criminal prosecutor.129 Because the interests of dependency courts, prosecutors,
and parents often conflict, it is unlikely that immunity will be granted in
exchange for parental testimony under the current statutory scheme.130 To
ensure that dependency courts can routinely hear such testimony, California Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1 should be amended to provide all parents blanket use and derivative use immunity.

CAL. CT. R. 5.548(c).
Id. at 5.548(d).
Id. at 5.548(d)(3).
124 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
125 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d)(1).
126 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
127 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007).
128 Compare id. § 355.1(f) (providing mere testimonial immunity to a parent who voluntarily testifies), with CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d)(3) (providing use and derivative use immunity when a parent is compelled to testify).
129 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d).
130 See supra notes 120–120, 126–127 and accompanying text.
121
122
123
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For such immunity to be effective, prosecuting agencies should be
completely excluded from dependency proceedings to ensure they cannot
access a parent’s testimony. While such agencies currently have a strong
interest in the decision to immunize a parent’s testimony, their exclusion
will alleviate the accompanying prosecutorial burden.131 A prosecuting
agency that receives notice of a parent’s alleged abuse or neglect from law
enforcement or the social worker, but is denied access to the child’s dependency case file, remains free to base its investigation solely on independent
sources without question as to how the information was discovered.
California law allows prosecuting agencies to be immensely involved
in dependency matters. When a parent is charged with criminal acts
against a child, the prosecuting attorney may step in to represent the minor
on behalf of the state in the dependency matter.132 The prosecutor may also
represent both the child in the dependency proceeding and the state in a
criminal proceeding against the parent, based on the same set of facts.133
Even if the prosecutor is not involved in the dependency matter, the prosecutor and law enforcement have statutory rights to access the minor’s case
file, including the parent’s testimony.134 This creates a risk that the testimony will be used against the parent in a criminal proceeding, regardless of
whether the parent accepts mere testimonial immunity or is compelled to
testify under a grant of use and derivative use immunity. The legislative
intent to encourage parental testimony is thus undermined if parents refuse
to testify out of fear that their testimony may be used against them.135 Furthermore, parents who are unaware that their testimony has been accessed
will also be unaware if any information derived from it is admitted in their
criminal case. Consequently, even the exclusionary rule will not protect
parents if they do not know to object.136
Parental testimony and psychological reports should not be discoverable by prosecutors. However, the prosecutor should be allowed to petition
the dependency court for access to the parents’ dependency-related disclosures for impeachment purposes137 or, if the parent chooses to testify in the
criminal matter, for purposes of prosecution for perjury.138 The juvenile
131 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972) (establishing that the prosecution has a
“heavy  burden”  to  prove  that  its  evidence  has  not been  obtained  as  a  result  of  a  defendant’s  immunized  
testimony). If the trier of fact finds that the prosecution had no means to access immunized testimony,
such a burden could easily be lifted.
132 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 681(b) (West 2007).
133 Id. § 317(c)  (providing  that  such  an  arrangement  “is  not  in  and  of  itself  a  conflict  of  interest.”).
134 Id. § 827(a)(1)(B), (E).
135 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 110–11 (Ct. App. 2007) (involving a father who refused to testify despite a court order).
136 See cases cited supra note 114.
137 See People v. Hathcock, 95 Cal. Rptr. 221, 223. (Ct. App. 1971) (“[A] witness who testifies at
a trial waives his privilege against self-incrimination as to any question which is thereafter asked to test
the  credulity  of  his  testimony”).
138 See Mackey   v.   United   States,   401   U.S.   667,   705   (1971)   (“[E]ven   when   the   privilege   against  
self-incrimination permits an individual to refuse to answer questions asked by the Government, if false
answers  are  given  the  individual  may  be  prosecuted  for  making  false  statements.”);;  CAL. PENAL CODE §
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court should confidentially determine whether the parent’s testimony in the
dependency and criminal proceedings truly conflict and limit access to the
relevant portions of the testimony. This method will shelter the testimony
from prosecutorial misuse, lessen the burden on prosecutors to prove that
the evidence came from an independent source, and prevent abuse by perjuring parents.
A statutory scheme limiting mandated disclosure requirements will also foster parents’ openness in court-ordered therapy. Statements relating to
the children in the dependency matter should be disclosed to the dependency court, rather than to law enforcement or the district attorney. This will
allow the dependency court to protect the children while preventing the unconstitutional use of the compelled incriminating statements against a parent in a subsequent trial. Furthermore, parents will more fully participate
in rehabilitative services when they trust that their disclosures will remain
confidential, and they will provide the dependency court with the information it needs to resolve the case in the best interests of the child.
CONCLUSION
California’s dependency law currently compels parents to testify upon
the threat of losing their children. Parents who face both the possibility of
losing their child and the threat of criminal prosecution are forced to
choose between cooperating with the dependency court to preserve their
parental rights or risking the loss of their child to preserve their Fifth
Amendment privilege. When parents invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in their child’s dependency case, California dependency courts currently have only two options: (1) proceed without the testimony to resolve
the child’s case; or (2) involve the prosecutor and grant parents the necessary use and derivative use immunity to compel them to testify.
Failure to provide parents with use and derivative use immunity violates their Fifth Amendment privilege and runs contrary to the best interests of the child, who deserves to have his or her case decided based upon
all relevant information. Thus, all parents should be granted statutory use
and derivative use immunity so that they may fully participate in dependency proceedings and court-ordered therapy. For such immunity to be effective, and to alleviate any potential prosecutorial burden, prosecutors
must be excluded from dependency matters. The dependency court will
have increased access to all relevant information to protect California’s
most vulnerable children; and prosecutors will be as free to prosecute as if
the testimony never existed.

14 (West 2007); CAL. CT. R. 5.548(e) (expressly stating that where parents are granted immunity and
compelled to testify in a dependency  matter,  they  still  “may  be subject to proceedings under the juvenile
court  law  or  to  criminal  prosecution  for  perjury”);;  In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 426 n.10 (Ct.
App.  1992)  (“[T]he purpose of use immunity is to secure truthful testimony, not to license perjury”).

